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Abstract

A canonical example of run-time type analysis is the
generic structural equality function.

Run-time type analysis allows programmers to easily and concisely define operations based upon type
structure, such as serialization, iterators, and structural
equality. However, when types can be inspected at run
time, nothing is secret. A module writer cannot use
type abstraction to hide implementation details from
clients: clients can determine the structure of these supposedly “abstract” data types. Furthermore, access control mechanisms do not help isolate the implementation
of abstract datatypes from their clients. Buggy or malicious authorized modules may leak type information to
unauthorized clients, so module implementors cannot reliably tell which parts of a program rely on their type
definitions.
Currently, module implementors rely on parametric
polymorphism to provide integrity and confidentiality
guarantees about their abstract datatypes. However,
standard parametricity does not hold for languages with
run-time type analysis; this paper shows how to generalize parametricity so that it does. The key is to augment
the type system with annotations about information-flow.
Implementors can then easily see which parts of a program depend on the chosen implementation by tracking
the flow of dynamic type information.

fun eq[’a] = typecase ’a of
bool
=> fn (x:bool, y:bool) =>
if x then y else false
| ’b * ’c => fn (x:’b*’c, y:’b*’c) =>
eq [’b] (fst x, fst y) &&
eq [’c] (snd x, snd y)
| ...

1

The eq function analyzes its type argument ’a and returns an equality function for that type.
Authors of abstract datatypes can use such generic
operations to quickly build implementations. For example, because equality for the following Employee.t
datatype is structural, one may implement it via generic
equality.
module Employee = struct
(* name, SSN, address and salary *)
type t = string * int * string * int
(* An equality for this type. *)
fun empEq (x : t) (y : t) =
Generic.eq [t] (x,y)
end :> sig
type t
val empEq : t -> t -> bool
end

Although type analysis is very useful, it can also be
dangerous. When types are analyzable, software developers cannot be sure that abstraction boundaries will
be respected and that code will operate in a compositional fashion. Consequently, type analysis may destroy
properties of integrity and confidentiality that the author
of the Employee module expects. Using type analysis, anyone may create a value of type Employee.t.
Although the type will be correct, other invariants not
captured in the type system may be broken. For example, malicious code can create employees with negative
salaries.

Introduction

Type analysis is an important programming idiom.
Traditional applications for type analysis include serialization, structural equality, cloning and iteration. Many
systems use type analysis for more sophisticated purposes such as generating user interfaces, testing code,
implementing debuggers and XML support. For this reason, it is important to support type analysis in modern
programming languages.
1
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Furthermore, even if the author of the Employee
module tries to keep aspects of the employee representation hidden, another module can simply use generic operations to discover them. For example, if no accessor was
provided to the salary component of an Employee.t,
malicious code could still extract it.
One answer to these problems is to simply prohibit
run-time type analysis. However, we believe the benefits of type analysis are too compelling to abandon altogether. Therefore, we propose a basis for a language
that permits type analysis, yet allows module writers to
define integrity and confidentiality policies for abstract
datatypes. In particular, we want authors to know: How
does changing the implementation of datatype affect the
rest of a program? How does code she writes depend on
the other abstract types they use?
In languages without type analysis, these questions
are easy to answer. Authors rely on parametric polymorphism to provide guarantees. The author knows the rest
of the program must treat her abstract datatypes as black
boxes that may only be “pushed around”, not inspected,
modified or created. Dually, authors are restricted in the
same fashion when using other abstract datatypes. In the
presence of type analysis, the programmer cannot know
what code may depend on the definition of an abstract
datatype. Any part of the program can dynamically discover the underlying type and introduce dependencies
on its definition.
In the past it has been suggested that type analysis
could be tamed by distinguishing between analyzable and unanalyzable types [6]. Unfortunately, just
controlling which parts of the program may analyze
a type does not allow programmers to answer our
questions. Imagine an extension, not unlike “friends” in
C++, where an author can specify which modules may
analyze a type. In the following code, modules A and B
may analyze the type A.t, and modules B and C may
analyze the type B.u.
module A = struct
type t = int
val x = 3
end :> sig
type t permit A, B
val x : t
end

Module C is not parametric with respect to A.t, even
though module C is not allowed to analyze A.t: If the
implementation of A.t changes, so does the value of
C.z. Despite restricting analysis of A.t to A and B, the
implementation of the type has been leaked to a thirdparty. Furthermore, because the type B.u is abstract, the
author of A cannot know of the dependency. Access control places undue trust in a client not to provide others
with the capabilities and information it has been granted.
Consequently, we must look beyond access-control for
a method of answering the desired questions.
We propose that tracking the flow of type information
through a program with information-flow labels allows
a programmer to easily determine how their type definitions influence the rest of the program. Information-flow
extends a standard type system with elements of a lattice
that describes the information content for each computation. For example, we could use a simple lattice containing two points L (low-security) and H (high-security).
A type boolH then means the expression it describes
could use “high-security” information to produce the resulting boolean, while an expression of type boolL requires only “low-security” information to produce its result. The novelty of our approach compared to previous
information-flow type systems is that we also label kinds
to track the information content of types.
To reason about abstract types in the presence of type
analysis, we label types with an information content that
can be tracked. Computations depending on those types
must also have that label.
module A = struct
type t = int
val x = 3
end :> sig
type tH
val x : tL
end

module C = struct
val z = case (Generic.cast [B.u] [int])
of SOME f => "It is an int"
| NONE
=> "It is not an int"
end :> sig
val z : stringH
end

module B = struct
type u = A.t
val y = A.x
end :> sig
type u permit B, C
val y : u
end

In the revised example, sealing module A with the signature sig type tH val x : tL end indicates
that the type definition t depends upon high-security information and the value x on only low-security information. The type B.u and value C.z must both be
labeled as high security because they depend upon the
high-security information in A.t. The presence of a label H alerts the author of A to a dependency.

module C = struct
val z = case (Generic.cast [B.u] [int])
of SOME f => "It is an int"
| NONE
=> "It is not an int"
end :> sig
val z : string
end

2
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module B = struct
type u = A.t
val y = A.x
end :> sig
type uH
val y : uL
end

Furthermore, only module A can create values of type
A.t that are labeled with L. Using type analysis to create values of type A.t would taint the result with H.
Therefore, if module A requires its inputs be of type
A.tL , then it is impossible to use its functions with
forged values. The author now has a guarantee that module invariants will be maintained and the integrity of her
abstraction will not be violated.
Information flow avoids the problems of access control because information must be propagated even when
no access occurs. For example, the identity function can
be assigned both the type A.tL →L A.tL and the
type A.tH →L A.tH witnessing that it propagates
the information content of the argument unchanged.
Here the function type → is itself labeled to indicate the
information content of creating the function—creating
the identity function does not require any information.
In the next section, we describe a core calculus for
combining information-flow and run-time type analysis.
We then follow with our key contribution: By tracking
the flow of type information, it is possible to generalize
the standard parametricity theorem for languages with
run-time type analysis. This generalized theorem can be
used in the same manner as parametricity to establish
integrity and confidentiality properties.

2

kinds
`

types & operators

type constructors
τ ::= α | λα:κ.τ | τ1 τ2
| bool | τ1 → τ2
| Typerec τ τbool τ→

λ-calculus
booleans & functions
analysis

types
σ ::= (τ)`

injection
`

| σ1 → σ2
| ∀`1 α:?`2 .σ

booleans
λ-calculus
polymorphism
fix-point
conditional
analysis

values
v ::= true | false | λx:σ.e | Λα:?` .e
term substitutions
type substitutions
term variable contexts
type variable contexts

The λSECi language

γ
δ
Γ
∆

::= · | γ, [e/x]
::= · | δ, [τ/α]
::= · | Γ, x:σ
::= · | ∆, α:κ

Figure 1. The λSECi language
The term form typecase can be used to define operations that depend on run-time type information. This
term takes a constructor to scrutinize, τ, as well as two
branches: ebool and e→ ). During evaluation the constructor argument is reduced to its head form so that the appropriate branch can be chosen.

Run-time type analysis

The grammar for λSECi appears in Figure 1. The
complete semantics for λSECi can be found in the extended version of this paper [19]. It is a predicative, callby-value polymorphic λ-calculus with booleans, functions and recursion. Fix-points are separate from functions to make nontermination aspects of proofs modular.
As in λML
, type constructors, τ, which can be anai
lyzed at run-time, are separated from types, σ, which
describe terms. We conjecture our results extend to
languages with impredicative and higher-order polymorphism, but for simplicity, we do not examine the problem in this paper.
The language of type constructors consists of the
simply-typed λ-calculus and two primitive constructors
that correspond to types: bool and τ1 → τ2 .

τ ;∗ bool
typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ ; eint
τ ;∗ τ1 → τ2
typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ ; e→ [τ1 ][τ2 ]

We write e ; e 0 to mean that term e reduces in a single
step to e 0 and τ ; τ 0 to mean that constructor τ makes
a weak-head reduction step to τ 0 .
λSECi also includes a constructor, Typerec, allowing
types to depend upon type information. Without Typerec, it is impossible to assign a type to some useful terms
that perform type analysis [6]. Typerec implements a
paramorphism (a type of fold) over the structure of the
3
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functions
polymorphism

terms
e ::= true | false
| x | λx:σ.e | e1 e2
| Λα:?` .e | e[τ]
| fix x:σ.e
| if e1 then e2 else e3
| typecase[γ.σ] τ ebool e→

λSECi is a core calculus combining information flow
and type analysis. We designed λSECi to be as simple as
possible while still retaining the flavor of the problem. It
is derived from the type-analyzing language λML
develi
oped by Harper and Morrisett [6] and the informationflow security language λSEC of Zdancewic [21].

2.1

κ ::= ?` | κ1 → κ2

L(?` ) , `
L((τ)` ) , `
L(σ1 ×` σ2 ) , `

A kind ?`1 is a sub-kind of ?`2 if `1 v `2 . Sub-kinding
for function kinds is standard. The relation is reflexive
and transitive by definition.
The label of a constructor τ of kind ?` , also describes
the information gained when the constructor is analyzed.
Type variables (such as Employee.t) may be given
a high security level so that their information content
may be traced throughout the program. For example, the
kind of a Typerec constructor must be labeled at least as
high as the analyzed constructor τ. This requirement
accounts for information gained by inspecting τ.

`

L(κ1 → κ2 ) , `
`

L(σ1 → σ2 ) , `
L(∀`1 α:?`2 .σ) , `1

Figure 2. Kind and type label operators
argument constructor. As in the following reduction
rules, when the head of the argument is one of the two
primitive constructors, Typerec will apply the appropriate branch to the constituent types and the recursive invocation of Typerec on the constituents.

` v `0

∆ ` τ : ?`
` `

0

` `

0

`0

∆ ` τbool : κ
`0

∆ ` τ→ : ? → ? → κ → κ → κ

Typerec (bool) τbool τ→ ; τbool

where ` 0 = L(κ)

∆ ` Typerec τ τbool τ→ : κ
Typerec (τ1 → τ2 ) τbool τ→ ;
τ→ τ1 τ2 (Typerec τ1 τbool τ→ )
(Typerec τ2 τbool τ→ )

2.2

By default the label on the bool constructor is set to ⊥.
The label of the kind for function constructors must be
at least as high as the join of its two constituent constructors. This is because the label must reflect the information content of the entire constructor.
`
The kinds of type functions, κ1 → κ2 , have a label
` that represents the information propagated by invoking the function. As shown below, the information, `, is
propagated into the result of application as κ2 t `. This
is shorthand for relabeling κ2 with L(κ2 ) t `.

The information content of constructors

Information-flow type systems track the flow of information by annotating types with labels that specify the
information content of the terms they describe. Because
our type constructors influence the evaluation of terms
in λSECi , we also label kinds.
Labels, `, are drawn from an unspecified join semilattice, with a least element (⊥), joins (t) for finite subsets of elements in the lattice, and a partial order (v).
The actual lattice used by the type system is determined
by the desired confidentiality and integrity policies of
the program. Intuitively, the higher a label is in the lattice, the more restricted the information content of a constructor or term should be. For most examples in this paper, we use a simple two point lattice (⊥ for low security,
> for high security) that tracks the dynamic discovery of
a single type definition. In practice, any lattice with the
specified structure could be used. An example of a practical lattice with richer internal structure is the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) of Myers and Liskov [10].
The labels on kinds describe the information content
of type constructors. The kind of a constructor (and
therefore its information content) is described using the
judgment ∆ ` τ : κ, read as “constructor τ is wellformed having kind κ with respect to the type variable
context ∆.” The operator L(κ), defined in Figure 2, extracts the label of a kind.
Our calculus is conservative: If the label of κ is `,
then the information content of a constructor of kind κ is
at most `. The information level of a constructor can be
raised via subsumption. As kinds are labeled, the ordering v on labels induces a sub-kinding relation, κ1 ≤ κ2 .

`

∆ ` τ1 : κ1 → κ2

∆ ` τ1 τ2 : κ2 t `

2.3

Tracking information flow in terms

The labels on types describe the information content
of terms. We use the judgment ∆? | Γ ` e : σ to mean
that “term e is well-formed with type σ with respect to
the term context Γ and the type context ∆? .” We use ∆?
to denote type variable contexts restricted to variables of
kind ?` for any label `. As we did for kinds, we define
(in Figure 2) the operator L(σ) to extract the label of
a type. Like constructors, the information content specified by labels for terms is conservative. The lattice ordering induces a subtyping judgment ∆? ` σ1 ≤ σ2 , and
subsumption can raise the information level of a term.
The types of λSECi include the standard ones for func`
tions σ1 → σ2 and quantified types ∀`1 α:?`2 .σ, plus
those that are computed by type constructors (τ)` . Note
that in the well-formedness rule for types formed from
type constructors, shown below, there is no need for a
connection between the label ` on the kind and the label
on the type.
∆? ` τ : ?`
∆? ` (τ)⊥

4
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∆ ` τ2 : κ1

That is because ` describes the information content of
0
τ, while the label ` 0 on (τ)` describes the information
0
content of a term with type (τ)` . It is sound to discard `
because once a constructor has been coerced to a type it
may only be used statically to describe terms and cannot
be analyzed.
Information flow is tracked at the term level analo`
gously to the type level. Term abstractions, σ1 → σ2 ,
like type functions propagate some information ` when
the are applied. Similarly, type abstractions, ∀`1 α:?`2 .σ,
propagate some information `1 when they are applied.
The label `2 is part of the kind of α.
Like Typerec, typecase examines the structure of the
scrutinee and learns the information it carries, so the label ` 0 on the type of the term must be at least as high in
the lattice as the label ` on the scrutinee.
?

α 7→ R ∈ η

η ` v ∼ v : bool

∀τ1 , τ2 .∀R ∈ τ1 ↔ τ2 .
η, α 7→ R ` v1 [τ1 ] ≈ v2 [τ2 ] : σ
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : ∀α:?.σ
e1 ;∗ v1

e2 ;∗ v2

e1 ↑

`

e2 ↑

η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ

lr:arr

lr:all

η ` v1 ∼ v2 : σ

η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ

lr:term

lr:divr

`

Figure 3. Logically related terms

3.1

Because the type of a typecase term can depend upon
the scrutinized constructor τ, an annotation, [γ.σ], is required for type checking.

Parametricity

For pedagogical purposes, this section and and the following section considers only the core of λSECi without
type constructors, security labels, or type analysis. That
is, a simple predicative polymorphic λ-calculus. None
of the results presented in these sections are new. Informally, the parametricity theorem states that well-typed
expressions, after applying related substitutions for their
free type and term variables, are related to themselves.
The power of the theorem comes from the fact that terms
typed by universally quantified type variables can be related by any relation. Section 3.2 considers some important corollaries of this theorem for reasoning about data
abstraction in programs.
The logical relation used by the parametricity theorem is defined in Figure 3. Terms are related with the
judgment η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ, read as “terms e1 and
e2 are related at type σ with respect to the relations in
η.” The relation between values is similarly defined as
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : σ. Because these relations are defined inductively over types which potentially contain free type
variables, the relations are parameterized by a map, η,
between type variables and binary relations on values.
This map is used when σ is a type variable (see rule
lr:var).
If σ is bool, the relation is identity. Typical for logical relations, values of function type are related only if
when applied to related arguments, they produce related
results. Terms are related if they evaluate to related values or both diverge. We write e ↑ to denote divergence.

Soundness

λSECi has the basic property expected from a typed
language, that well-typed programs will not go wrong.
Theorem 2.1 (Type Safety). If ` e : σ then e either
evaluates to a value or diverges.
The theorem is proven syntactically using the standard progress and preservation lemmas [20]. Details
can be found in the extended version of this paper [19].

3

lr:bool

η ` v 1 ∼ v 2 : σ1 → σ2

∆? | Γ ` typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ : σ[τ/γ]

2.4

lr:var

∀(η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ1 ).η ` v1 e1 ≈ v2 e2 : σ2

∆ `τ:?
∆ , γ:? ` σ
` v `0
∆? | Γ ` ebool : σ[bool/γ]
0
0
∆? | Γ ` e→ : ∀` α:?` .∀` β:?` .σ[α → β/γ]
0
where ` = L(σ[τ/γ])
?

v1 Rv2

η ` v1 ∼ v2 : α

Generalizing parametricity

Reynold’s parametricity theorem has long been used
to reason about programs in languages with parametric
polymorphism [13]. For example, the theorem can be
used to show that different implementations of an abstract datatype do not influence the behavior of the program or to show that external modules cannot forge values of abstract types. These are only a few of the corollaries of the parametricity theorem. This sections starts
with an overview of the standard parametricity theorem,
and then examine how it can be generalized for λSECi .
Proofs for the lemmas and theorems that follow be can
found in the extended version of this paper [19].
5

Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’05)
0-7695-2266-1/05 $ 20.00 IEEE

∀α:? ∈ ∆? .(η(α) ∈ δ1 (α) ↔ δ2 (α))
η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆

?

∀x:σ ∈ Γ.(η ` γ1 (x) ≈ γ2 (x) : σ)
η ` γ1 ≈ γ2 : Γ

3.2

Applications of the parametricity theorem

tslr:base

The parametricity theorem has been used for many
purposes, most famously for deriving free theorems
about functions in the polymorphic λ-calculus, just by
looking at their types [18]. Our purpose is more similar to that of Reynolds: reasoning about the properties
of programs in the presence of type abstraction. While
Reynolds separated parametric polymorphism from adhoc polymorphism, we show how to generalize his work
to both sorts of polymorphism.
Corollaries of Theorem 3.1 provide important results
for reasoning about abstract types in programs. Many
specific properties can be proven as a consequence of
parametricity, but we believe the following two are representative of what a programmer desires.

slr:base

Figure 4. Substitutions for parametricity
The most important rule defines the relationship between values of type ∀α:?.σ. Polymorphic values are
related if their instantiations with any pair of types are
related. Furthermore, we can use any relation R between
values of those types as the relation on α. We use the notation R ∈ τ1 ↔ τ2 to mean that R is a binary relation on
values of type τ1 and of type τ2 . If quantification over
types of higher kind were allowed, R must be a function
on relations. This extension is orthogonal to our result,
so we restrict ourselves to polymorphism over kind ?.
To state the parametricity theorem, we must define
the notion of related substitutions for types and related
terms. In Figure 4, the rule tslr:base states that a relation
mapping η is well-formed with respect to two type substitutions δ1 and δ2 for the variables in the type context
∆? . There are no restrictions on the range of the type
substitutions. On the other hand, slr:base requires that a
pair of term substitutions for the variables in Γ must map
to related terms. Even though λSECi has call-by-value
semantics, term substitutions must map to terms, not values. Otherwise, it would it be impossible to prove the
case for fix-points which requires a term substitution.
With these definitions it is possible to state the parametricity theorem for our restricted language:

Corollary 3.3 (Confidentiality). If α:? | x:α ` e : bool
and ` v1 : τ1 and ` v2 : τ2 then e[τ1 /α][v1 /x] ;∗ v
iff e[τ2 /α][v2 /x] ;∗ v.
This first corollary says that a programmer is free to
change the implementation of an abstract type without
affecting the behavior of a program. It is the essence
behind parametric polymorphism—type information is
not allowed to influence program execution and values
of abstract type must be treated parametrically.
Corollary 3.4 (Integrity). If α:? | · ` e : α then e must
diverge.
This second corollary states that there is no way for
a program to invent values of an abstract type, violating
the integrity of the abstraction.

Theorem 3.1 (Parametricity). If ∆? | Γ ` e : σ and
η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆? and η ` γ1 ≈ γ2 : Γ then η `
δ1 (γ1 (e)) ≈ δ2 (γ2 (e)) : σ.

3.3

Parametricity and type analysis

Consider the following λSECi term (eliding labels):

The proof is by induction on the typing judgment.
One significant complication in the proof is circularity in relating fix-points. To escape this problem we apply a syntactic technique from Pitts [11]. We define a restricted fix-point that can only be unfolded a finite number of times before diverging. The term fixn+1 x:σ.e
unwinds to e[(fixn x:σ.e)/x]. By definition fix0 x:σ.e always diverges. It is then straightforward to show that for
any n, fixn x:σ.e is related to itself. Then the following
continuity lemma can be used to prove that unbounded
fix-points are related to themselves.

typecase [γ.bool] α true (Λα:?.Λβ:?.false)
This term violates Corollary 3.3, because we can substitute bool and bool → bool for α and it will produce
different values: true versus false.
Still, we would like to state properties similar to
Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4 for λSECi . It is not possible to
directly extend the inductive proof for typecase. The
proof would require that the two terms would produce related results, even when they may analyze different constructors. Furthermore, λSECi presents another complication: The weak-head normal forms of types include (for
example) Typerec with its scrutinee a variable. Therefore, the logical relation must be extended to include
these sorts of types.

Lemma 3.2 (Continuity). If η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆? and
for all n, η ` fixn x:σ1 .e1 ≈ fixn x:σ2 .e2 : σ where
δ1 (σ) = σ1 ,δ2 (σ) = σ2 then η ` fix x:σ1 .e1 ≈
fix x:σ2 .e2 : σ.
6
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`1 6v `0

`1 v `0
bool ∼`0 bool : ?

`1

`1 t `2 v `3
τ1 ≈`0 τ3 : ?`1

constructor contexts
ρ ::= • | Typerec ρ τbool τ→ | ρ τ

tslr:type-opaq

ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : ?`1

weak-head normal-form constructors
ν ::= bool | τ1 → τ2 | λα:κ.τ

tslr:type-bool

`3 v `0
τ2 ≈`0 τ4 : ?`2

τ1 → τ2 ∼`0 τ3 → τ4 : ?`3

weak-head normal-form types
`

Figure 6. Additional syntactic forms

∀(τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ1 ).ν1 τ1 ≈`0 ν2 τ2 : κ2 t `1
`

1
ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : κ1 →
κ2

τ1 ;∗ ν1

τ2 ;∗ ν2
τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ

ζ ::= (bool)` | (ρ{α})` | σ1 → σ2 | ∀`1 α:?`2 .σ

tslr:type-arr

ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : κ

τ ; τ0

tslr:arr

lated by tsclr:base if and only if their weak-head normal
forms are related.
As suggested by tslr:type-opaq, if two constructors
carry information more restrictive than the level of the
observer, the observer shouldn’t be able to tell them
apart. For example, bool : ?> and bool → bool : ?> ,
which carry “high-security” information >, will be indistinguishable to an observer at a “low-security” level ⊥.
This is formalized in the following lemma.

To solve the problem with typecase, we require that
the constructors used to instantiate polymorphic types
be related to each other, as defined in the next subsection.
Labeling kinds is the key to making this change practical,
because it means the relation need not be the identity relation when types are used parametrically. The need for
extra rules to handle additional weak-head normal form
types is solved by generalizing the trick of quantifying
over all relations between values of given types, to quantifying over families of relations on values of the correct
types.

Lemma 3.5 (Obliviousness for constructors). If `
τ1 , τ2 : κ and L(κ) 6v `0 then τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ.
Finally, we can state a substitution theorem for constructors that is a simpler version of parametricity:
Lemma 3.6 (Substitution for constructors). If ∆ ` τ :
κ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆ then δ1 (τ) ≈`0 δ2 (τ) : κ.

Related constructors

In this lemma, related type substitutions map type
variables to related constructors, as defined in the following rule

The first step towards a generalized parametricity theorem is formalizing what it means for type constructors
to be related. We write τ1 ≈` τ2 : κ to mean closed
constructors τ1 and τ2 are related at kind κ with respect
to an observer at level ` in the label lattice. Similarly, the
judgment ν1 ∼` ν2 : κ indicates that closed weak-head
normal constructors ν1 and ν2 are related at kind κ with
respect to an observer at level `. The grammar of weakhead normal constructors and relations on constructors
is defined in Figures 6 and 5, respectively.
The rule for type functions, tslr:arr, is standard for
logical relations. There are three rules for kind ?. The
first rule, tslr:type-opaq, codifies that if the label of the
constructors is higher than the observer, then the constructors are indistinguishable. The remaining two rules
state that if the label of a primitive constructor is less
than the observer, their components must appear related
to the observer. Constructors not in normal form are re-

∀α:κ ∈ ∆.(δ1 (α) ≈`0 δ2 (α) : κ)
δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆

3.5

Related terms

As with constructors, we parameterize the logical relation on terms by an observer `. We write η ` e1 ≈`
e2 : σ to indicate that terms e1 and e2 are related to
an observer at level ` at type σ, with the relation mapping η. As with constructors we distinguish between
related terms and related normal forms, writing the judgment η ` v1 ∼` v2 : ζ to indicate that values v1 and
v2 are related to an observer at level ` at the weak-head
normal type ζ, with the relation mapping η. These relations, as defined in Figure 8, are similar to the ones in
7
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(τ1 → τ2 )` ; (τ1 )` → (τ2 )`

Figure 7. Type reduction

tsclr:base

Figure 5. Logically related constructors

3.4

`

(τ)` ; (τ 0 )`

α 7→ R ∈ η

`1 v `0 =⇒ v1 R`ρ1 v2

η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : (ρ{α})`1
`1 v `0 =⇒ v1 = v2
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : (bool)`1

slr:bool

∀(η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ1 ).
η ` v1 e1 ≈`0 v2 e2 : σ2 t `1
`

1
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : σ1 →
σ2

slr:arr

∀(τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : ?`2 ).
∀(R`ρ2 ∈ δ1 ((ρ{τ1 })`2 ) ↔ δ2 ((ρ{τ2 })`2 )).
η, α 7→ R ` v1 [τ1 ] ≈`0 v2 [τ2 ] : σ t `1
R consistent
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : ∀`1 α:?`2 .σ
e1 ;∗ v1
σ ;∗ ζ
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : ζ

∗

e 2 ; v2

η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ
(e1 ↑) ∨ (e2 ↑)
η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ

ρ{τ} for filling a context’s hole with τ.
Previously, values were related at a type variable
only if they were in the relation mapped to that variable by η. Here η maps to families of relations. We
write R`ρ for the application of R to a label ` and a context ρ, yielding a relation. Therefore, when we write
R`ρ ∈ δ1 ((ρ{τ1 })` ) ↔ δ2 ((ρ{τ2 })` ) we mean that R is
a dependent function of ` and ρ yielding a relation on
values of type δ1 ((ρ{τ1 })` ) and δ2 ((ρ{τ2 })` ).
Quantification over R is required to be consistent. In
this context, that means if v1 R`ρ1 v2 and `1 v `2 then
v1 R`ρ2 v2 . This is adequate for call-by-value because
quantification is over families of value relations. Therefore requiring that R yield relations that are strict or preserve least-upper bounds is unnecessary, as values are always terminating. It is important that the logical relation
itself is consistent, that is, closed under subsumption.

slr:var

slr:all

Lemma 3.8 (Term relation consistent). If δ1 ≈`0 δ2 :
∆? and η ` ∆? and ∆? ` σ1 ≤ σ2 and η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 :
σ1 then η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ2 .

sclr:term

We write η ` ∆? to mean that the mapping η is wellformed with respect to a pair of type substitutions, δ1
and δ2 , as defined in the rule:

sclr:divr

Figure 8. Logically related terms

η(α) consistent
∀α:?`1 ∈ ∆? .(η(α)`ρ1 ∈ δ1 ((ρ{α})`1 ) ↔ δ2 ((ρ{α})`1 ))

Figure 3. One difference is that we relate only values at
weak-head normal types ζ, defined in Figure 6. Restricting the value relation to weak-head normal types makes
the logical relation much easier to state and understand.
Like constructors, the relation over terms is defined
so that terms typed at a level greater than the observer
will be indistinguishable. This is enforced by the precondition `1 v `0 found in slr:var and slr:bool. The antecedent relations in slr:arr and slr:all have their types
joined with `1 ; this accounts for information gained by
destructing the value. The following lemma verifies our
intuition about indistinguishability:

η ` ∆?

The last significant difference in Figure 3 is in slr:divr.
Terms are related if either diverges, as opposed to our earlier definition where divergent terms were related only
to other divergent terms. This is a significant theoretical weakening. In particular, the logical relation is no
longer transitive. However, this definition is standard
for information-flow logical relations proofs with recursion [1, 21]. Furthermore, we believe that this weakening is acceptable in practice. We discuss in more detail
in Section 3.6 how this requirement is merely an artifact
of call-by-value information-flow.

Lemma 3.7 (Obliviousness for terms). If ∆? | · `
e1 , e2 : σ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆? and L(σ) 6v `0 then
η ` δ1 (e1 ) ≈`0 δ2 (e2 ) : σ.

3.6

Generalized parametricity

Before stating the generalized parametricity theorem,
we must define a notation of related term substitutions.
Given related type substitutions, δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆? , and
a well-formed mapping, η ` ∆? , term substitutions are
related if they map variables to related terms.

There are two other significant differences between
Figures 3 and 8: additional preconditions in slr:all and
generalizing lr:var to slr:var. The rule slr:var solves the
problem with Typerec appearing in the weak-head normal form of types. It generalizes lr:var to terms related at
a constructor that cannot be normalized further because
of an undetermined type variable. We characterize these
constructors with constructor contexts, ρ, defined in Figure 6. Contexts are holes •, Typerecs of a context, or
a context applied to an arbitrary constructor. We write

∀x:σ ∈ Γ.(η ` γ1 (x) ≈`0 γ2 (x) : σ)
η ` γ1 ≈`0 γ2 : Γ

The only change from slr:base is the additional of a label
`0 for the observer.
8
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Theorem 3.9 (Generalized parametricity). If ∆? | Γ `
e : σ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆? and η ` ∆? and η ` γ1 ≈`0
γ2 : Γ then η ` δ1 (γ1 (e)) ≈`0 δ2 (γ2 (e)) : σ.

Corollary 3.11 (Noninterference). If ·, x:σ1 ` e : σ2
where L(σ1 ) 6v L(σ2 ) then for any ` v1 : σ1 and `
v2 : σ1 it is the case that if both e[v1 /x] and e[v2 /x]
terminate, they will both produce the same value

As with standard parametricity, the proof is by induction over ∆? | Γ ` e : σ. In addition to the lemmas
mentioned in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, Lemma 3.2 must be
extended in the straightforward manner.
We call Theorem 3.9 generalized parametricity because Theorem 3.1 can be (almost) recovered by a series
of restrictions:

More importantly, it is also possible to restate the
corollaries of standard parametricity. The previous subsection stated the revised corollary for confidentiality.
The same can be done for integrity:
Corollary 3.12 (Integrity). If α:?> | · ` e : (α)⊥ then
e must diverge.

• Use a two element lattice, ⊥ and >, where ⊥ v >.
Furthermore, it is also possible to make much richer
and refined claims because the label lattice expands
upon the implicit two level lattice used by parametricity.

• For every κ in ∆? , Γ , e, and σ require L(κ) = >.
• For every σ 0 in Γ , e, and σ require L(σ 0 ) = ⊥.

4

• Require that the observer be ⊥.
Even with these restrictions, because of the difference
in sclr:divr, Theorem 3.9 makes a weaker claim about the
termination behavior of related terms than Theorem 3.1.
Consider the generalized version of Corollary 3.3.

λSECi draws heavily upon previous work on type analysis, parametricity, and information flow.
Most information flow systems use a lattice model
originating from work by Bell and LaPadula [3] and
Denning [4]. Volpano et al. [16] showed that Denning’s
work could be formulated as type system and proved its
soundness with respect to noninterference. Heintze and
Riecke’s formalized information-flow and integrity in a
typed λ-calculus with references, the SLam calculus [7],
and proved a number of soundness and noninterference
results. Pottier and Simonet have developed an extension to ML, called FlowCaml, and have shown noninterference using an alternative syntactic technique [12].
Prior to our research, FlowCaml was the only language with polymorphism and a noninterference proof.
FlowCaml does not consider run-time type analysis and
can rely on standard parametricity for types. The noninterference result for λSECi directly builds upon the methods of Zdancewic [21] and Pitts [11].
Other researchers have noticed the connection between parametricity and noninterference. The work of
Tse and Zdancewic [15] compliments our research by
showing how parametricity can be used to prove noninterference. Tse and Zdancewic do so by encoding Abadi,
et al.’s [1] dependency core calculus into System F.
The fact that run-time type analysis (and other forms
of ad-hoc polymorphism) breaks parametricity has been
long understood, but little has been done to reconcile the
two. Leifer et al. [8] design a system that preserves type
abstraction in the presence of (un)marshalling. This is
a weaker result because marshalling is merely a single
instance of an operation using run-time type analysis.
Rossberg [14] and Vytiniotis et al. [17] use generative

Corollary 3.10 (Confidentiality). If α:?> | x:α ` e :
(bool)⊥ then for any ` v1 : τ1 and ` v2 : τ2 if
e[τ1 /α][v2 /x] and e[τ2 /α][v2 /x] both terminate, they
will produce the same value.
This corollary states that what we substitute for α and
x will not affect the value computed by e. However, it
is possible that our choice of α and x could cause e to
diverge.
Unlike standard parametricity, Theorem 3.9 has an
explicit observer. Standard parametricity has an implicit
observer that can observe all computation. What makes
information-flow techniques work is that some computations are opaque to the observer. Furthermore, the results of these computations are also inaccessible to the
observer, making them effectively dead code. However,
because the operational semantics is call-by-value, dead
code must be executed even though the result is never
used. Therefore, we conjecture that using a call-by-need
operational semantics an exact correspondence could be
recovered; the only part of the proof that would need to
change is obliviousness for terms, Lemma 3.7.

3.7

Related work

Applications of generalized parametricity

A typical corollary of Theorem 3.9 is normally called
noninterference; that it is possible to substitute values indistinguishable to the observer and get indistinguishable
results.
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types to hide type information in the presence of runtime analysis, relying on colored-brackets [5] to provide
easy access. However, none of this work has formalized
the abstraction properties that their systems provide.

5

[5] D. Grossman, G. Morrisett, and S. Zdancewic. Syntactic type abstraction. Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 22(6):1037–1080, Nov. 2000.
[6] R. Harper and G. Morrisett. Compiling polymorphism
using intensional type analysis. In 22nd ACM Symp. on
Principles of Programming Languages, pages 130–141,
San Francisco, Jan. 1995.
[7] N. Heintze and J. G. Riecke. The SLam calculus: Programming with secrecy and integrity. In Proc. 25th ACM
Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, San
Diego, CA, 1998.
[8] J. J. Leifer, G. Peskine, P. Sewell, and K. Wansbrough.
Global abstraction-safe marshalling with hash types. In
Proc. 8th ICFP, pages 87–98, Uppsala, Sweden, 2003.
[9] A. C. Myers, S. Chong, N. Nystrom, L. Zheng, and
S. Zdancewic. Jif: Java information flow. Software release. Located at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif.
[10] A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. Protecting privacy using the
decentralized label model. Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 9(4):410–442, 2000.
[11] A. M. Pitts. Parametric polymorphism and operational
equivalence. Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 10:1–39, 2000.
[12] F. Pottier and V. Simonet. Information flow inference for
ML. In Proc. 29th ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, Portland, OR, Jan. 2002.
[13] J. C. Reynolds. Types, abstraction, and parametric polymorphism. In R. E. A. Mason, editor, Information Processing 83, pages 513–523, Amsterdam, 1983. Elsevier
Science Publishers B. V.
[14] A. Rossberg. Generativity and dynamic opacity for abstract types. In Proc. of the 5th International ACM Conference on Principles and Practice of Declarative Programming, Uppsala, Sweden, Aug. 2003.
[15] S. Tse and S. Zdancewic. Translating dependency
into parametricity. In Proc. of the 9th ACM International Conference on Functional Programming, Snowbird, Utah, September 2004.
[16] D. Volpano, G. Smith, and C. Irvine. A sound type system for secure flow analysis. Journal of Computer Security, 4(3):167–187, 1996.
[17] D. Vytiniotis, G. Washburn, and S. Weirich. An open
and shut typecase. In Proc. of the 2nd ACM Workshop on
Types in Language Design and Implementation, Longbeach, California, January 2005.
[18] P. Wadler. Theorems for free! In FPCA89: Conference
on Functional Programming Languages and Computer
Architecture, London, Sept. 1989.
[19] G. Washburn and S. Weirich. Generalizing parametricity using information flow (extended version). Technical Report MS-CIS-05-04, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA, to appear 2005.
[20] A. K. Wright and M. Felleisen. A syntactic approach to
type soundness. Information and Computation, 115:38–
94, 1994.
[21] S. Zdancewic. Programming Languages for Information
Security. PhD thesis, Cornell University, 2002.

Conclusion

With λSECi , we address the conflict between run-time
type analysis and enforceable data abstractions. By labeling their type abstractions, software developers can
easily observe dependencies.
However, this refinement comes at with the penalty
of having to write many annotations for a program to
type check. We have not investigated how pervasive the
necessary annotations will prove in practice. Existing
large scale languages, such as Jif [9] and FlowCaml [12],
implement some form of information-flow inference, but
they can be difficult to use. Languages based on λSECi
have the advantage that if the only goal is to secure type
abstractions and no type analysis is performed, then no
information-flow annotations are necessary. Regardless,
it will be imperative to study the cost of maintaining the
necessary annotations in practical languages based upon
λSECi .
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